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Abstract
This paper uses a newly assembled multi-country multi-industry
rm-level dataset to test the e¤ect of productivity and networking on
the export probability of rms. Results are in line with the new-new
trade theory and with the literature on the information value of net-
works. Firms are more likely to export if they are more productive,
larger, and if they benet from foreign networks (ownership and -
nancial linkages), domestic networks (chamber of commerce, links to
regulation), and communication networks (E-mail, internet). Firms
bear a lower probability of exporting if they have state or labor net-
works. Overall, rms with better network connections by one standard
deviation enjoy a 15% higher probability of exporting.
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1 Introduction
Even a cursory glance at the data reveals that not all rms are engaged in
international trade. This diversied reality about the export performance of
rms has recently found a theoretical collocation in general equilibrium mod-
els such are those proposed by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003)
and Melitz (2003), which rely mainly on rmsheterogeneity in productiv-
ity. The positive e¤ect of productivity on the probability of exporting is well
documented in many studies. Evidence in this sense is found inter alia in
Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997), Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard
and Jensen (1999, 2004). Our results conrm that the probability of export-
ing is increasing with productivity using rm level data from many countries
and sectors.
A di¤erent strand of literature has studied the role of networks in facilitat-
ing international trade; see, e.g., Rodrick (2000), Rauch (2001), Casella and
Rauch (2002), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002),
Rauch and Casella (2003), Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005). Networks
and connections reduce the disadvantage presented by informational barriers,
and hence reduce the cost of economic transactions. In line with this litera-
ture, we nd that rms are more likely to export if they benet from foreign
networks (ownership and nancial linkages), domestic networks (chamber of
commerce, links to regulation), communication networks (E-mail, internet).
Firms bear instead a lower probability of exporting if they are a¤ected by
state or labor networks.
Our results suggest a possible link between the two literatures cited above.
In the rst literature, productivity and the xed exporting cost are the key
factors generating the partition between exporters and non exporters. For a
given xed exporting cost, the higher the rm productivity the more likely
is that the rm exports; for a given level of rm productivity, the lower the
xed exporting cost faced by the rm the more likely it is that the rm
exports. In the second literature, the barrier to international trade is typi-
cally informational (the cost of acquiring knowledge about foreign suppliers,
foreign consumers, foreign business and regulation practices, and the cul-
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tural environment in general). These informational barriers may be seen as a
form of xed exporting cost. Thus, one may postulate that foreign network
connection reduce xed exporting costs thereby increasing the probability of
exporting. We are agnostic as to whether this is indeed the causal chain but
the empirical evidence gives plausibility to this hypothesis opens the way to
interesting research avenues.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the estimated
relationships, Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 shows the empirical
results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimated relationship
In this section we draw two empirically veriable conclusions from the reading
of the theoretical literature.
In theoretical models in the vein of Melitz (2003), a rm exports if foreign
prots are non-negative and does not export otherwise. Foreign prots are
given by foreign revenues minus variable cost (including variable trade cost),
minus xed exporting cost. Foreign revenues increase with productivity and
variable cost decrease with productivity. Therefore, for given xed exporting
cost:
1. the probability of exporting is increasing with rm productivity.
In the theoretical literature on networks a reduction in informational
barriers increases international trade (possibly because they have lower xed
exporting cost). This possible link between xed exporting costs and infor-
mational barriers is suggestive but not crucial for our purposes. From the
literature on networks we simply draw that
2. a rm with better networking connections has a higher probability of
exporting.
These two conclusions may be summarized in the following relationships
to be tested empirically:
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Probability of Exporting = f(productivity, networking connections) (1)
The empirical methodology adopts the following probit regression of the
export dummy 	cij for rm j in industry i of country c.
	cij = & ic + Xcij + cij (2)
The dependent variable is regressed on various determinants Xcij : pro-
ductivity, employment, and variables related to rms connections to net-
works. Regressions include country-industry xed e¤ects to control for omit-
ted variables which are specic to each sector in each country, and are esti-
mated with robust standard errors.
3 Data description
We use the Enterprise Survey rm-level dataset which is based on a World
Bank survey of a representative sample of an economys private sector. The
surveys cover a broad range of business environment topics including in-
frastructure, crime, competition, access to nance, corruption, and perfor-
mance measures. 1
We derive an export dummy (=1 if the rm exports, and 0 otherwise)
from the information on whether the rm exports. Tables 1 and 2 present
the percentage of rms that export, by country and by industry respectively.
Note that about 30 percent of rms in our sample are exporters but the
percentage is 8 percent for smaller rms, is about 25 percent for medium size
1The survey is conducted by private contractors and is answered by business owners
and top managers. The manufacturing and services sectors are the primary business
sectors of interest. This corresponds to rms classied with ISIC codes 15-37, 45, 50-52,
55, 60-64, and 72 (ISIC Rev.3.1). . . . Formal (registered) companies with 5 or more em-
ployees are targeted for interview. Services rms include construction, retail, wholesale,
hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, communications, and IT. Firms with 100% gov-
ernment/state ownership are not eligible to participate in an Enterprise Survey. . . . In
each country, businesses in the cities/regions of major economic activity are interviewed.
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/).
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rms, and is 51 percent for larger rms.
[TABLE 1 AND 2 HERE]
Productivity is proxied by the ratio of sales to employment, in log terms,
which is commonly used when total factor productivity is not available (sales
are converted in US.$ in order to make them comparable across countries).2
We also add employment as a proxy for rmssize.
There is no standard way to measure all possible network connections
which inuence rms economic activity. Within the economic indicators
available in the dataset we use the following variables: "Firms is in a joint
venture", "Firms uses E-mail", "Firm has website", and "Firm belongs to
a chamber of commerce", which are dummy variables: 1 if the rm does, 0
otherwise. "Foreign nancing", which is measured by the percentage of work-
ing capital nanced by foreign-owned banks. "Foreign participation", which
is measured by the percentage of the rm owned by foreign private sector.
"Time spent with govt regulations", which is measured by the percentage of
senior managements time spend dealing with government regulations. "State
participation", which is measured by the percentage of the rm owned by
the state. "Unionization" which is measured by the percentage of labor force
unionized.
Most of the network variables employed, such as joint venture, chamber
of commerce, foreign nancing and participations directly relate to networks.
Some other variables relate to network more indirectly and would also relate
to other important economic factors such as technology, institution, culture,
and so on. For instance, E-mail and website may be interpreted as
technology variables that reduce the xed cost of gathering information; but
xed costs are reduced precisely because this technology allows rms to be
part of a network (the web). Another example is "Time spent with govt
regulations" which may be a function of the country institutional and reg-
ulatory environment; however, once controlling for country-industry xed
e¤ects, the residual e¤ect at the rm level is likely to reect the role rms
network connections useful to penetrate heavily regulated markets or mar-
2See, for example, Helpman et al. (2004), Eaton et al. (2008), and the survey o¤ered
by Wagner (2007).
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kets upon which governments have a large inuence. Another example is
"Unionization" which is a network of workers reecting labor market insti-
tutions and regulations, and often presenting a negative externality for the
rm. What all these variable have in common is that they can all be related
to networking.
In order to gauge the overall e¤ect of network connections (beyond that
of any single variable) we construct a synthetic index of all variables that
can directly or indirectly characterize a network connection. We name it
"network index". Such network index is the sum of all network variables
after they are standardized (i.e. demeaned, and divided by their standard
deviation), and the sign of each component is adjusted to reect a positive
e¤ect on the probability of exporting. Only the sign of two variables is
changed before summing them (the percentage of workforce unionized and
state participation), as these two variables tend to appear with a negative
sign, and presumably characterize costs or frictions. For convenience, the
network variable is normalized (zero mean and standard deviation equal to
1).
For each underlying variable, we carefully check the data for extreme val-
ues (dropping few rms whose employment or sales would be reported as
larger than national aggregate indicators at the country level available in
standard macroeconomic databases such as World Bank or IFS), consistency
checks (dropping rms where reported categories of employment would not
add up to total reported rm employment, or reported categories of capital
would not add up to total reported rm capital), and for outliers (observa-
tions deviating from the country-industry mean by more than three standard
deviations, in log terms). After data cleanup, our data set encompasses about
8,000 rms in 24 industries and 32 countries.3 Summary statistics for the
3The industries in our sample are: Textiles; Leather; Garments; Agroindustry; Food;
Beverages; Metals and machinery; Electronics; Chemicals and pharmaceutical; Construc-
tion; Wood and furniture; Non-metallic and plastic materials; Paper; Sport goods; IT ser-
vices; Other manufacturing; Accounting and nance; Advertising and marketing; Other
services; Retail and wholesale trade; Transport; Mining and quarrying; Auto and auto
components; Other transport equipment. The countries in the sample (with the respec-
tive year of survey) are: Algeria 2002; Bangladesh 2002; Chile 2004; China 2003; Ecuador
2003; Egypt 2004; El Salvador 2003; Ethiopia 2002; Guatemala 2003; Honduras 2003; In-
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variables used are in Table 3.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
4 Empirical results.
The e¤ect of productivity, size and network connections on the probability
of exporting is explored in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
Table 4 uses OLS to check the contribution of each set of variables to
the variability of the export dummy. Country e¤ects have a stronger ex-
planatory power than sector e¤ects (with an R2 of about 13 percent and 7
percent respectively). Both country and industry e¤ects have an explanatory
power close to the sum of the two e¤ects separately. With country-industry
e¤ects, the R2 rises to about 27 percent. Productivity variables and network
variables, when entered alone, have a similar explanatory power (17 percent
versus 15 percent respectively). When all variables enter the regression, the
R2 is about 36 percent. Replacing all network variables with the synthetic
network index implies only a minimal reduction in explanatory power (the
R2 is about 35 percent).
[TABLE 4 HERE.]
Tables 5 and 6 show probit regressions of the export dummy on productiv-
ity, size, and networks variables.4 In Table 5 robust standard errors are em-
ployed, while in Table 6 we cluster errors by country and industry and results
are unchanged. The Tables show that both rmsproductivity and rmssize
have a positive and signicant e¤ect which conrms results well established
in the literature. The tables also show importance of the explanatory vari-
ables related to various forms of rmsconnections to networks (the following
e¤ects are based on the rst column of these tables, when all variables are si-
dia 2000; Kosovo 2003; Kyrgyzstan 2003; Lithuania 2004; Madagascar 2005; Malawi 2005;
Mauritius 2005; Morocco 2004; Nicaragua 2003; Pakistan 2002; Philippines 2003; Poland
2003; Serbia 2003; South Africa 2003; Sri Lanka 2004; Tajikistan 2003; Tanzania 2003;
Thailand 2004; Turkey 2005; Uzbekistan 2003; Vietnam 2005; Zambia 2002.
4The coe¢ cients in the tables with probit regressions represent marginal e¤ect, i.e.
the change in the probability for an innitesimal change in each independent, continuous
variable.
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multaneously included). Firmsforeign connections are all positively related
to the probability of exporting: an increase in Foreign nancing or Foreign
participation by 10% is associated with a 3% and 2% (respectively) increase
in the probability of exporting, while rms with a Foreign joint venture are
16% more likely to export. Firms are also more likely to export if they
have more advanced communication technologies (rms employing E-mail or
websites are associated with a 14% or 7% higher probability of exporting,
respectively), or stronger domestic connections (rms which are member of a
chamber of commerce are associated with a 13% higher probability of export-
ing) or by the time spent with government regulations (a 10% larger share
of senior managements time spent dealing with government regulations is
associated with a 2% higher probability of exporting). Younger rms tend to
be associated with a higher export probability (every additional 10 years of
existence are associated with a 2% decrease in the probability of exporting).5
Lastly, rms a¤ected by state or labor networks tend to export less: a 10%
increase in state participation is associated with a 3% lower probability of
exporting; the e¤ect of unionization is very small when controlling for all
variables (in column 1 of both table 5 and 6), but in column 12 of both
tables a 10% increase in state participation is associated with a 1% lower
probability of exporting).6 Overall, an improvement the network index by
one standard deviation is associated with a higher probability of exporting
of about 15%.
[TABLE 5 and 6 HERE]
5As xed e¤ects control for the (slight) di¤erence in years of the survey across countries,
the variable related to "Year rm began operations", is automatically equivalent to the
opposite of the age of the rm. Note that this result is in contrast with the literature on
advanced economies (see for example Barba Navaretti et al., 2010), where older rms are
more likely to export, and may reect the more vibrant nature of the
countries in our sample.
6The variables "Firms is in a joint venture", "Firms uses E-mail", "Firm has website",
and "Firm belongs to a chamber of commerce", are dummy variables: 1 if the rm does, 0
otherwise. "Foreign nancing" is measured by the percentage of working capital nanced
by foreign-owned banks. "Foreign participation" is measured by the percentage of the
rm owned by foreign private sector. "Time spent with govt regulations" is measured by
the percentage of senior managements time spend dealing with government regulations.
"State participation" is measured by measured by the percentage of the rm owned by
the state. "Unionization" is measured by the percentage of labor force unionized.
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5 Conclusions.
What determines the export performance of rms? Recent theoretical devel-
opments in the trade literature point at productivity as a key determinants,
while a separate strand of literature has highlighted over the past decade the
importance of networking connections. The empirical literature has exten-
sively documented the importance of productivity for the export performance
of rms, while evidence of the role of networks is very limited. This paper
makes use of a cross-country and multi-sector rm level data to jointly con-
rm these theories. We nd that rms are more likely to export if they are
more productive and larger, but also if they benet from foreign networks
(nancial, ownership, or joint-venture links), domestic networks (chamber of
commerce, links to regulation), and communication networks (E-mail, Web-
site), while their export performance su¤ers from state and labor networks
(government participation or unionization).
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SIZE 1 2 3 TOTAL
number employees Æ  1‐24 25‐99 100+ ALL
Algeria2002 0% 0% 4% 1%
Bangladesh2002 7% 23% 36% 30%
Chile2004 10% 26% 53% 30%
China2003 4% 0% 6% 4%
Ecuador2003 10% 22% 40% 22%
Egypt2004 4% 20% 41% 17%
ElSalvador2003 5% 43% 70% 35%
Ethiopia2002 0% 19% 8% 8%
Guatemala2003 11% 35% 70% 31%
Honduras2003 6% 24% 69% 19%
India2000 47% 58% 67% 60%
Kosovo2003 0% 17% 0% 4%
Kyrgyzstan2003 7% 17% 25% 15%
Lithuania2004 11% 42% 68% 47%
Madagascar2005 0% 0% 75% 69%
Malawi2005 0% 35% 44% 36%
Mauritius2005 0% 33% 67% 40%
Morocco2004 21% 39% 71% 50%
Nicaragua2003 4% 27% 46% 12%
Pakistan2002 8% 10% 25% 10%
Philippines2003 6% 17% 60% 35%
Poland2003 6% 17% 45% 20%
Serbia2003 17% 14% 20% 17%
SouthAfrica2003 29% 38% 54% 46%
SriLanka2004 10% 23% 52% 38%
Tajikistan2003 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tanzania2003 26% 31% 46% 33%
Thailand2004 19% 40% 70% 61%
Turkey‐b2005 16% 39% 65% 47%
Uzbekistan2003 6% 0% 0% 2%
Vietnam2005 7% 20% 50% 35%
Zambia2002 21% 18% 51% 31%
ALL countries 8% 25% 51% 31%
Table 1
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS THAT EXPORTS BY COUNTRY 
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SIZE 1 2 3 TOTAL
number employees   Æ 1‐24 25‐99 100+ ALL
Textiles 7% 22% 46% 30%
Leather 10% 57% 75% 46%
Garments 11% 39% 80% 55%
Agroindustry 23% 27% 56% 38%
Food 7% 24% 43% 26%
Beverages 6% 14% 11% 10%
Metals and machinery 7% 26% 47% 28%
Electronics 15% 16% 62% 43%
Chemicals and pharmaceutics 10% 20% 33% 22%
Construction 7% 7% 10% 8%
Wood and furniture 4% 26% 62% 26%
Non‐metallic and plastic materials 9% 21% 43% 24%
Paper 5% 10% 31% 18%
Sport goods 45% 100% 100% 63%
IT services 8% 11% 7% 9%
Other manufacturing 10% 24% 34% 26%
Accounting and finance 0% 0% 0% 0%
Advertising and marketing 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other services 0% 0% 0% 0%
Retail and wholesale trade 0% 100%          8%
Transport 0% 0%          0%
Mining and quarrying 50% 0% 83% 55%
Auto and auto components 17% 19% 21% 20%
Other transport equipment 40% 56% 63% 55%
ALL sectors 8% 25% 51% 31%
Table 2
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS THAT EXPORTS BY INDUSTRY
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm is an exporter (1) 7862 0.31 0.46 0.00 1
Log of productivity 7862 9.76 2.17 ‐5.72 20.81
Log of employment 7862 4.30 1.55 0.69 11.13
Foreign financing (2) 7430 1.03 7.53 0.00 100
Firm is in a joint venture with a foreign partner(1) 5737 0.07 0.26 0.00 1
Foreign participation (3) 7815 9.98 27.63 0.00 100
Firm uses email (1) 7409 0.62 0.49 0.00 1
Firm has website (1) 7291 0.35 0.48 0.00 1
Firm belongs to a chamber of commerce (1) 6041 0.67 0.47 0.00 1
Time spent with gov’t regulations (4) 6102 8.78 13.70 0.00 100
State participation (5) 7815 6.32 22.56 0.00 100
Unionization (6) 7246 19.06 35.30 0.00 100
Year firm began operations 6938 1983 18 1838 2004
Network index (7) 2356 0.00 1.00 ‐2.50 7.30
(1) Dummy variable: 1 i f the  fi rm does , 0 Otherwise.
(2) Percentage  finance  for working capi ta l : foreign‐owned banks ; 
(3) Percentage  of fi rm owned by foreign private  sector;
(4) Percentage  of senior management's  time  spent deal ing with government regulations ;
(5) Percentage  of fi rm owned by the  s tate
(6) Percentage  of labor force  unionized.
(7) See  text for defini tion.
Table 3
Summary Statistics
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VARIABLES CE IE CE IE C*IE C*IE C*IE C*IE C*IE C*IE none none none none
Log of productivity 0.049 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.012 0.02 0.021
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)*** (0.002)***(0.001)***
Log of employment 0.106 0.102 0.087 0.099 0.122 0.125 0.131
(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***
Foreign financing 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.031)** -0.124 -0.161
Foreign joint venture 0.106 0.084 0.065
(0.001)*** (0.015)** (0.051)*
Foreign participation 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***
Firm uses Email 0.088 0.108 0.062
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.006)***
Firm has website 0.053 0.083 0.029
(0.013)** (0.000)*** -0.17
Firm part of chamber of commerce 0.092 0.188 0.083
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***
Time spent with gov't regulations 0.001 -0.001 0
(0.039)** (0.060)* -0.64
State participation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008)*** (0.021)** (0.048)**
Unionization 0 0 0
-0.365 -0.212 -0.299
Year firm began operations 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***
Network index 0.11 0.09
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant 0.01 0.296 0.052 0.511 0.001 -0.059 -0.414 -4.342 -0.784 -0.324 -3.843 -6.101 -0.388
-0.316 (0.000)***(0.007)***(0.000)*** -0.987 -0.412 (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***
Observations 7963 7963 7963 7963 7862 7963 7862 2356 2356 7862 2379 2356 2356
R-squared 0.13 0.07 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.25
Robust p-values in parentheses CE      = country effects CE IE  = country effects +industry effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 IE       = industry effects C*IE   = country/industry effects
TABLE 4
OLS regression of the export dummy on fundamentals controlling for country*industry effects
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VARIABLES
Log of productivity 0.06 0.051 0.055 0.046 0.05 0.04 0.046 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.049 0.052 0.064
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***
Log of employment 0.119 0.128 0.137 0.123 0.135 0.11 0.121 0.111 0.129 0.134 0.147 0.142 0.135
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***
Foreign Financing 0.003 0.004
(0.023)** (0.000)***
Foreign Joint Venture 0.159 0.13
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
Foreign Participation 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm uses Email 0.14 0.201
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm has Website 0.067 0.131
(0.016)** (0.000)***
Firm part of Chamber of Commerce 0.128 0.093
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Time spent with gov't regulations 0.002 0.001
(0.014)** (0.021)**
State Participation -0.003 -0.002
(0.029)** (0.000)***
Percentage of workforce unionized 0 -0.001
-0.359 (0.000)***
Year firm began operations 0.002 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
Network index 0.155
(0.000)***
Observations 2311 7526 6591 7422 7422 7183 7067 5733 7198 5859 5643 7064 2311
Pseudo R2: 0.314 0.315 0.308 0.323 0.316 0.335 0.323 0.339 0.322 0.315 0.291 0.312 0.308
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 5
Probit regression of the export dummy on fundamentals controlling for country*industry effects
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VARIABLES
Log of productivity 0.06 0.051 0.055 0.046 0.05 0.04 0.046 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.049 0.052 0.064
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***
Log of employment 0.119 0.128 0.137 0.123 0.135 0.11 0.121 0.111 0.129 0.134 0.147 0.142 0.135
(0.000)*** (0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***(0.000)***
Foreign financing 0.003 0.004
(0.038)** (0.000)***
Foreign joint venture 0.159 0.13
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
Foreign participation 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm uses Email 0.14 0.201
(0.004)*** (0.000)***
Firm has website 0.067 0.131
(0.019)** (0.000)***
Firm part of chamber of commerce 0.128 0.093
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Time spent with gov't regulations 0.002 0.001
(0.033)** (0.028)**
State participation -0.003 -0.002
(0.012)** (0.002)***
Unionization 0 -0.001
-0.394 (0.000)***
Year firm began operations 0.002 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
Network index 0.155
(0.000)***
Observations 2311 7526 6591 7422 7422 7183 7067 5733 7198 5859 5643 7064 2311
Pseudo R2: 0.314 0.315 0.308 0.323 0.316 0.335 0.323 0.339 0.322 0.315 0.291 0.312 0.308
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 6
Probit regression of the export dummy on fundamentals controlling for country*industry effects: errors clustered at country*industry level
